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abstract
 There has been a strong focus on employer interest in working 
time flexibility within industrial relations, and it has been extensively 
debated whether this interest is mainly found in certain sectors or 
certain types of labor markets. However, relative little debate exists on 
different interests among employees, although conditions for striking 
a balance between working life and family life depend on the welfare 
provisions offered. Drawing on case studies of collective bargaining 
at the company level in the American and Danish metal industry, 
this article argues that agreements on flexible working hours vary 
due to both different employer and employee interests. Agreements 
on working time flexibility are concluded within a complex interplay 
between sectors, industrial relations, and the welfare state.
Author’s address: Oester Farimagsgade 5, P.O. Box 2099, Dk-1014 Copenhagen k, Den-
mark
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introduction
 Due to increased international competition, employers across the Western 
world show a growing interest in the implementation of external flexibility 
(hiring and firing of employees) as well as internal flexibility (flexible hours), 
although with different emphasis in different sectors (katz and Darbishire 
2000). On the one hand, employers depend more on skilled and experienced 
workers and have to utilize the hours worked; on the other hand they con-
tinuously need to adjust the number of employees. Nevertheless, important 
country-specific variations exist with regard to employer orientations toward 
flexibility. Following the Varieties of Capitalism School, strongly regulated 
Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs) like Germany have a larger preva-
lence of flexible working hours than less strictly regulated Liberal Market 
Economies (LMEs) like the United States, which, however, have a larger 
prevalence of hiring and firing (Hall and Soskice 2001). In recent years, Den-
mark has been highlighted as a hybrid of CMEs and LMEs (a so-called Nego-
tiated Economy [NE]), with a large prevalence of both internal and external 
flexibility. However, little is known about how the orientation of employees 
toward work-life balances affects the actual elaboration of working time flex-
ibility at the company level in these different economies.
 This paper examines how the interests of employers as well as of employ-
ees contribute to trade-offs on flexible working hours at the company level in 
the United States and Denmark. Company-level bargaining on working time 
flexibility in two highly unionized companies in the manufacturing industry—
one from each country—are compared, and it is questioned whether there 
are any significant differences in employee interests that might contribute to 
a different pattern of working time flexibility. For instance, it is well known 
that the prevalence of so-called family friendly hours or flexitime (that is, 
the possibility for employees to vary the start and finishing times of work), 
is lower in the United States than in many other countries. In Denmark 51 
percent of employees report this as an opportunity, whereas this is only the 
case for 28 percent of American employees. In manufacturing the figures 
for Denmark and the United States are 58 percent and 24 percent respec-
tively (BLS 2005).1 This seems to support the notion that employers position 
themselves differently toward flexibility in different economies, but it does 
not reveal whether this also results in different orientations among employ-
ees or if alternative trade-offs on other types of flexible working hours are 
developed.
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bargaining interests on Flexible Working Hours in denmark  
and the United states
 Flexible working hours in the manufacturing industry of Denmark is pre-
dominantly regulated through sector-level framework agreements (Industriens 
Overenskomst, Industriens Funktionæroverenskomst). These agreements 
leave considerable room for company-specific adjustments of working hours 
under the condition that a local shop steward is present and can reach an agree-
ment with management on the issue. As the Danish manufacturing industry 
is highly organized with a broad coverage of shop stewards (approximately 77 
percent of companies with twenty employees or more has shop stewards), most 
companies can make use of this possibility (Ilsøe forthcoming). The standard 
work week is thirty-seven hours, but it is possible to conclude agreements on 
a different duration of the work week (longer/shorter working hours), differ-
ent scheduling (shift work, night/weekend work, other nonstandard hours), 
and different distribution (annualized hours, flextime) (Marginson and Sisson 
2004). Furthermore, a paragraph in the sector-level agreement has, since 2000 
allowed, company-level bargaining parties to agree to ignore the chapter on 
working hours altogether. However, as with all other agreements the Working 
Time Directive of the European Union defining a maximum of forty-eight 
working hours per week and a minimum of eleven hours of rest per day must 
be respected. In practice, only a limited number of companies have made use 
of this option (forty-six agreements had been closed until 2006), as the scope 
for variation is already high within the chapter on working hours.
 In the American manufacturing industry working hours are regulated 
through the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), which limits the 
standard weekly working hours to forty. All hours exceeding this limit within 
a 168 hours period must be paid as overtime (that is, 150 percent of nor-
mal wages). This means that cost-neutral bargaining options on annualized 
hours/flextime are limited, and employers focus on nonstandard hours and 
(forced) overtime (Golden and jorgensen 2002). As the union density is low 
among employees in the private sector (8 percent), trade unions fear that 
deviations from the FLSA will result in longer hours and lower pay (BLS 
2007; AFL-CIO 2007). In the public sector, where the union density among 
employees is higher (37 percent), supplementary legislation, the Federal 
Employees Flexible and Compressed Work Schedules Act of 1982, offers a 
greater scope for working time flexibility at the workplace level.
 The regulatory frameworks in the manufacturing industry of Denmark 
and the United States contribute to different choices on working time flex-
ibility among employers. However, other macrolevel factors affect employer 
interests as well. Increasing scarcity of certain types of skilled labor, which has 
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been reported in both countries, can force employers to focus more on the 
utilization and retention of skilled employees through flexible hours (Berg et 
al. 2003). On the side of the employees, an interest in working time flexibility 
must be expected to interact with the welfare provisions offered for work-
ing families (day care, leave options, etc.) as well as wage levels. Low wages 
increases the dependency on overtime payment that can potentially be lost 
due to flexible schemes. The interest in flexible hours by both parties must also 
be seen in the light of the local bargaining power of management and union 
representatives, respectively, and the social contract they have developed in 
their bargaining relation (Walton et al. 1994). Low union presence as well as 
conflictual relations can be potential barriers for negotiating agreements on 
flexible hours.
methods and cases
 In keeping with the focus of this paper on comparing employer/employee 
interests and trade-offs on flexible hours in Danish and American settings, the 
two cases were carefully chosen to exclude the most common barriers for the 
development of both employer and employee interest in flexible hours. Apart 
from being large, multinational companies in manufacturing with agreements 
on flexible working hours, both companies had wage levels above average, a 
high percentage of skilled employees, a high union presence, and consensus-
oriented bargaining relations (see Table 1).
 Each company was contacted through a major trade union in the manufac-
turing industry—the Central Organization of Industrial Employees (CO-indus-
tri) in Denmark and the International Association of Machinist and Aerospace 
Workers (IAMAW) in the United States. In the American case the director of 
the local union lodge and the production manager of the company were inter-
viewed (spring 2007), whereas the leading shop steward was interviewed twice 
in the Danish case (spring/fall 2005). All interviews were fully transcribed, and 
all written agreements for each company studied before analysis.
case presentations: dK productions vs. Us productions
 The story on company level bargaining of flexible hours in the Danish 
multinational, Dk Productions, begins in 2000, when three agreements were 
settled for different groups of employees at one of the factories in Denmark. 
The use of working time flexibility was not new, as there was a long tradition 
of flextime at the company. It had been introduced to tackle the somewhat 
predictable but quite substantial fluctuations in demand. However, according 
to the shop steward, the aim of the agreements was to formalize the devel-
oped informal practice because the informality caused a lot of trouble for 
both management and employees. Some employees saved too many hours on 
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their time accounts, which from time to time caused health problems. Fur-
thermore, in case these employees were fired, the large savings of hours left 
the company with great expenses and the employees without unemployment 
insurance. Other employees—especially parents with small children—took 
time off on a regular basis to pick up their children or participate in social 
activities at the day care. Over time these employees would accumulate large 
deficits on their time accounts that they had no idea how to work off. In case 
these employees got fired or resigned, they would have to pay the company 
significant compensation.
 According to the shop steward, the large fluctuations of the time accounts 
could not be separated from the fact that the accounts were mainly controlled 
by the employees themselves. Changes in start and finishing times was only 
reported to the management and time off in lieu was coordinated with col-
leagues. However, the employees expressed great satisfaction with this time 
sovereignty, and it was an important motivation factor in their work. Both 
management and shop stewards wanted to prevent the large problematic 
fluctuations, but they did not want to lose the employee-controlled flextime 
altogether, as the company and the working families gained mutual benefit 
from it. Therefore, they agreed on introducing a set of relatively tight upper 
and lower limits on the time accounts of the employees (see Table 1). Today, 
each account is revised every three months by management and shop stewards, 
and deviations result in individual agreements on how and when to balance 
the account. This seems to work to the satisfaction of both management and 
employees.
 In the American multinational, US Productions, company-level bargaining 
on working hours took off in 1996, when a pilot agreement on compressed 
work weeks was implemented at one of the factories in the United States. At 
that time management needed more employees than they could recruit; in 
TABLE 1 
Basic Facts on the Danish and the American Case Study Companies
 US Productions Dk Productions
Employees at Facility  
 Studied (and Worldwide) 1,200 (6,000) 700 (5,000)
Type of Working Time  
 Flexibility Implemented Scheduling of hours:  Distribution of hours: 
  4 10-hour days, Monday   Upper and lower limits 
  to Thursday; or 3 12-hour   on time accounts +/–24 
  days, Friday to Sunday  or +/–20 hours
Shop Stewards 230 (union representatives  8 (full-time union 
  on demand)  representatives)
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addition, they wanted to staff the factory around the clock. As a result many 
employees worked a lot of overtime and found it difficult to get a day off. 
According to the director of the local union, management suggested solving 
the problem by introducing a nonregular work week, where five eight-hour 
work days could be placed differently from week to week according to manage-
ment’s discretion. The union opposed the idea, as it would leave employees 
unable to predict their own working time and plan their family life, so they 
surveyed the employees and came up with an alternative suggestion. The union 
proposed a new scheduling of weekly working hours, where some workers 
would work ten hours a day Monday through Thursday and others would work 
twelve hours a day Friday through Sunday. This would allow workers more 
time off and more predictable time off. The management approved, as this 
scheme would result in around-the-clock operations and a better utilization 
of machinery. A pilot agreement on the new schedule was closed with the 
union; it included an incentive pay in order to attract workers to volunteer. 
However, the new schedule soon became popular among the employees and 
the extra pay was removed when the agreement was renegotiated in 2001. 
Today, approximately 10 percent of the workers in the production facility work 
under the new schedule, and the schedule is conceived as a success from the 
point of view of both employees and management. More employees wish to 
join and are currently on waiting lists. The director of the local union explains 
that younger workers with small children, in particular, work under the new 
schedule, as the three-day, twelve-hour schedule on weekends gives them the 
opportunity to save on day care. If one parent works Monday to Friday and 
the other parent Friday to Sunday, the only have to take their children to day 
care on Friday. This saves the families a lot of money on expensive child care 
arrangements.
case analysis
 The agreements on working time flexibility in Dk Productions and US 
Productions display interesting similarities as they both imply an increased 
mutual control of working hours. In the Danish case extreme time sovereignty 
formerly had negative consequences for management as well as employees 
but is now balanced by collective evaluations of individual flextime accounts. 
In the American case an unpopular, costly, and mainly employer-controlled 
overtime is now reduced thanks to a collective agreement that allow workers 
to choose a compressed work week schedule. The different content of the 
agreement (flextime vs. compressed work week) on the one hand reflects the 
different regulatory frameworks in the two countries. Due to the FLSA Ameri-
can employers are less interested in flexible hours distributed over longer 
periods than Danish employers. On the other hand, this also seems to reflect 
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the different welfare provisions offered for working families in Denmark and 
the United States and how work-life balance is conceptualized among employ-
ees.
 Case studies of Danish companies with compressed work weeks have shown 
that employees with young children tend to leave companies when such work-
ing hours are introduced in Denmark (Ilsøe 2006). The case of US Productions 
suggests that this might not be the preference among American employees. It 
is attractive to American workers to save on day care, even if this means that 
they will spend very little time together as parents. This is a significant finding in 
the case of US productions, as their employees are among some of the highest 
paid workers in the region. However, a comparison of average day care prices in 
Denmark and the United States might set this difference in employee prefer-
ences into perspective. The cost of full-time day care for infants and toddlers 
(0–2 years) as well as preschool children (3–5 years) is between 25 to 30 percent 
higher for parents in the United States than in Denmark, even though average 
American wages are half of Danish ones (see Table 2). This asymmetry suggests 
that day care expenses on average make up a larger part of parents salaries in 
the United States than in Denmark. Furthermore, other differences in the day 
care provisions offered might contribute to the different strategies for work-life 
balances among Danish and American workers. The Danish day care system 
is a state-led system with consistent quality standards, availability guarantees, 
and high support from public means. The public spending on families is lower 
in the United States than in Denmark (1.4 vs. 3.9 percent of the GDP) as well 
as the participation rate in child care services (36 vs. 62 percent for infant or 
toddler, 62 vs. 90 percent for preschool), which might reflect poorer availability 
(OECD 2007). In addition, the quality of day care in the United States can be 
questioned , as many providers are unlicensed and therefore not regulated by 
the state (NACCRRA 2007).
conclusion and perspectives
 The regulation of overtime payment in the FLSA sets a limit on the interest 
of American employers in flextime, whereas Danish regulation does not inhibit 
employer interests in the same way. However, two case studies of collective 
bargaining on flexible hours at Danish and American companies suggest that 
this does not allow us to conclude a larger prevalence of working time flexibility 
in Denmark than in the United States altogether. The American case dem-
onstrates that not only does different regulation generate different employer 
interests; different welfare provisions also generate different employee inter-
ests. This raises the question of whether it is possible to talk about only one 
type of work-life balance and highlight one type of flexible working hours (like 
flextime) as family-friendly.
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 The analysis of the case studies does not support the argument that the 
form and prevalence of working time flexibility is a global and evenly distrib-
uted phenomenon along sector-specific employer interests. Nor does it sup-
port the argument that working time flexibility strictly follows the pattern of 
employer interests that you can find in the Varieties of Capitalism School. There 
appears to be another factor in play—namely, the interests of employees—
which depends on the welfare benefits offered. Variations in working time 
flexibility and work-life balance is created in the clash between sector-specific 
conditions, national regulation and welfare provisions for working families. 
Therefore, studies on flexible working hours within Industrial Relations should 
reflect this complexity to a larger extent by including employee interests and 
welfare provisions in their analyses.
note
1. See also http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org.
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